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One Poem and Cognitive Linguistics

David Paxman

ark Turner has stated that the mind
is literary: it uses what we categorize as literary devices to think
through most ordinary problems (1996, 7).
Among these devices are the projection of
one story onto another, with "story" here
being interpreted as even minimal scripts
such as motion through space. Approaching
literature through such common cognitive
processes does pose some problems, however. Some of these problems arise from language which, according to cognitive linguistics, reflects cognition. In the words of
Ungerer and Schmid, cognitive linguistics is
"an approach to language that is based on
our experience of the world and the way we
perceive and conceptualize it" (1996, x).
Problems arise because language makes possible certain types of play, deceit, and representation not bound by ordinary constraints.
What we have in literature may be cognitive
special effects, or constructs that use cognitive processes and concepts but do so in
unusual ways. Therefore literature may be
susceptible to cognitive analysis but may not
show us much about how cognition is
constituted.
I apply here only a small slice of the
available strands in cognitive linguistics, but
it is a very important slice, having to do with
the blending of concepts in figurative thinking. Ronald Langacker (1987-1991) assures
us that figurative language is no peripheral
matter. Although many linguists ignore this
topic, "it would be hard to find anything
more pervasive and fundamental in
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language, even (I maintain) in the domain of
grammatical structure; if figurative language
were eliminated from our data base, little if
any data would remain" (1:1). Langacker
also insists that we not force a distinction
between rule-governed creativity, of the type
that leads to novel expressions, and creativity in a more general sense exhibited in
figurative language and original thinking.
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) offer one
model of metaphorical mapping and blending. This model includes two cognitive
domains, called source and target, that are
blended or mapped onto each other. In the
metaphor, "the taste of the self is very
sweet," the source domain of eating food is
mapped onto the target domain of one's
experience of the self. Such mapping allows
us to conceptualize a less concrete, less structured idea such as the self in terms of a more
concrete, physical, and structured concept
such as tasting food. Mark Turner and Gilles
Fauconnier have recently proposed a more
elaborate model which loses some of the parsimony of the two-domain model but gains
in being able to account for more of the structure and effects of blending. This model
includes

•
•
•

two input spaces: source and target
a generic space: a skeletal structure
that applies to both input spaces
a blended space: a rich space integrating, in partial fashion, specific structure from both input spaces and often
including structure not projected to it
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from either. Note that the blend is
not compositional (1995, 182-183)
An example will clarify how useful
these four spaces are. Here is a thinking
problem: "A Buddhist monk begins at
dawn to walk up a mountain. He stops
and varies his pace as he pleases, and
reaches the mountaintop at sunset. There
he meditates overnight. At dawn, he
begins to walk back down, again moving
as he pleases. He reaches the foot of the
mountain at sunset. Prove that there is a
place on the path that he occupies at the
same hour of the day on the two separate
journeys" (Turner 1996, 72). By imagining
a scenario in which two monks set out on
the same day, one heading up and the
other down, we can prove that, regardless of their pace, they will meet. The
point at which the two monks meet is the
place that the one monk occupied at the
same hour of the day on two separate
journeys.
This many-space model offers advantages (Turner and Fauconnier 1995,
185-87). Chiefly, it shows that the blended space has its own logic not always
available from either of the two input
spaces. In the monk's journey problem
above, the image available in the blended
space, that of two monks traveling
toward each other from opposite ends of
the trail, yields a point at which they
cross, a point not available in either input
space. The generic space clarifies the
structure in terms of which the logic of
the blend works. The model also clarifies
that the target influences meaning, so it,
too, is considered an "input" along with
source domain.
Let us apply this model to a poem
and see how it helps to reveal some of the
cognitive strategies of the poem, especially those that involve the blending of
domains through analogy and metaphor.
I have selected this poem almost at
random from a recent monthly.

These Days
by Peter Davison
Days when it's easy, the water
seems wonderfully clear, not a
chance of drowning. Objects
appear so close that you need only
reach down for them into coolness
until the word offers up:
as though you could shape thought with
your thumb. Around you the air
blossoms with names for itself.
The noise of the waves tearing
the shore apart blooms like
French horns, and the taste
of the self is very sweet. These days
it's easy to forget how
stubborn silence can be, how
rapidly glibness drains the mind of every
nutrient, what fanatic reinforcements
the armies of emptiness can bring forward.
These days every choice is clear, every
location opens at a touch to
yield its necessary
drop of honey, every word glows
with exactly the wanted
intensity of
tilt. (Davison 2000)

The many-space model helps to clarify how the meaning of specific lines is
produced by the blending of domains.
One of the first things to discover is that
there may be more than one target and
source in what appears as a single blend.
Blends are nutshelled inside other
blends, so to speak. I have numbered
these to keep them distinct, with the
lower numbered target being most immediate to the blend and the higher being
the more remote. After some examples I
note what is gained by blending input
spaces in the manner observed.
Example 1: "Objects / appear so close
that you need only / reach down for
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them into coolness / until the word offers
up."
target 2=days of a certain type
target l=finding words
source l=reaching for objects in clear
water
source 2=a desired thing offers up;
what is wanted comes to one
generic space=an action (reaching)
under favorable conditions (clear,
cool water) triggers a desired
event. Or: inanimate things
behave with volition in keeping
with one's desire. Note that even
this structure is a blend having its
own input spaces: inanimate
objects are seen as responsive to
our intentions.
blended space=reaching for a word is
like reaching for an object; at
some point the word will come to
the hand
gain=the pleasant (cool) tactile sensation of reaching through a clear
medium for something you can
see is seen as a cause that triggers
in words an inclination to volunteer themselves to the mind
Example 2: "as though you could shape
thought with your thumb"
target 3=thinking, writing
target 2=good days
target l=wanting the right words
source=molding an unspecified material (clay, for example) with
thumb
generic=causing shape, influencing
form
blend=words shaping thoughts (or
thoughts being shaped into
words?) just as one wishes
Example 3: "around you the air / blossoms with names for itself"
target 2=thinking or writing successfully
target l=recognizing words for air;
naming in general
source=plants producing flowers

generic space=yielding, as in flowers
producing blossoms on their own
blend=air yields right names for itself
gain=insubstantial medium substantially yields the right insubstantial
representations
We can use the many-space model to
interpret the poem as a whole.
Overall, the poem has this kind of
blended space:
target 2=successful cognition (or, if
cognition is metonym, writing)
target 1=experience of a type of days
(what are good days like?)
source 2=goodness
source l=various concrete types of
reaching and abstract types such
as naming
generic=fulfilled motion or sensory
experience
blend=days as various types of pristine sensory experience and
motor movement.
Note that good days are not seen simply as pristine sensory experience,
but that this model maps onto
thinking and writing.
gain=depict the act of clear and successful thinking without having to
demonstrate it with clear thought;
conceptualize proper naming without having to name. Instead these
mental activities are conceived
through analogs in concrete
sensory experience.
Blended spaces provide, I think, a
clearer, more complete model for teaching metaphor than most literary discussions of metaphor, perhaps because the
model recognizes that metaphor is not
simply aesthetic ornament but a fundamental strategy of thought.
Yet the model does not provide a
complete tool set for literary analysis.
Even with the many-space model and the
compositional nature of language
accounted for, the poem has something to
say about cognition that is not derived
from any of these tools of analysis. In
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general, the poem implies that good days
are those when cognition works naturally
and effortlessly to yield precisely what
one needs: "every choice is clear," and
every location gives "its necessary drop
of honey." This thought pushes us away
from the mechanisms of cognition to its
purposes and direction, something that
cognitive science has more difficulty
explaining.
Oddly, what the poem says about
cognition is achieved by violating the
limits in which cognitive processes are
usually most reliable and productive.
Literature breaches ordinary cognition.
For example, take the closing lines,
"every word glows /with exactly the
wanted /intensity of / tilt." This passage
does what we now see other image clusters in the poem do: it blends from
domains so different that the blended
space can be entertained only as a fiction.
Air blossoms, waves sound like French
horns. The gaps between the what is possible in the everyday world and what
happens in the line stir the mind: waves
only remotely sound like a brass instrument, but the mind can savor, in a fleeting way, the overlap of wave and French
horn. The concluding line, for final effect,
stretches the pattern of disrupted ordinary cognition even further: we have
domains of words, glowing light, and
spatial orientation in "tilt," with overtones of angular readiness. In some ways,
it is an impossible blend. Impossible, yet
indicative of the poetic nature of cognition itself. For those who remember pinball games, the word "tilt" recruits an
added domain of corrupting recreation.
Reuven Tsur holds the opinion that
literature works by making ordinary cognition break down; it then exploits that
breakdown for other effects (1992, 3-4).
Ellen Spolsky comes from a different
angle: literature is just one of many
attempts to create coherence out of cognitive processes that are already full of
gaps and ruptures. In her account, the
modular mind can't fully translate infor-

mation in one domain or module (say,
smell or motion along a path) to every
other domain or module, so cognition is
characterized by incompleteness. Cognition is a patchwork of redundant systems working to provide complete information. The system is clunky, but it
works better for shooting an arrow than
building coherent understanding.
Literature strives for coherence, but as in
the word that glows with intense tilt,
poetry reminds us is that many domains
don't map very well, and none of them
map completely. If they did, we would
not need to achieve knowledge by mapping. There would be uniformity and
integration instead. Cognitive linguistics
gives us understanding of the mechanisms of meaning. Poems expose these
mechanisms, and in so doing, show us
the ruptures and breakdowns. As
Spolsky says, "the mind itself can hurt
you into poetry" (1993,2,5-6).
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